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ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 
AND DIVERSIFICATION 
JOHANNES M. PENNINGS 




Employing concepts of lateral and longitudinal learning, we examined 
the dissolution of 462 expansions of Dutch firms, both acquisitions and 
new ventures. We interpreted the endurance of an expansion as reflect- 
ing success. Results show that expansions were more persistent when 
related to a firm's core skills, fully owned, and the result of acquisition 
rather than internal development. Expansions were also likely to last 
longer if a firm's prior diversification activity level was high. 
This article presents an empirical study on organizational learning and 
corporate diversification. The primary research question links these con- 
cepts and explores whether expansion decisions are better if they are an- 
chored in organizational know-how. Are expansion projects more successful 
if they are proximate to firms' core skills, and do diversifying firms gain from 
experiences with earlier diversification moves? 
Diversification decisions are among the most important a firm's manag- 
ers make. Diversification extends a firm's domain but entails risk and un- 
certainty. Firms seek to bridge the distance between their current stock of 
know-how and that which they aspire to hold. Internal development, in- 
cluding innovation, amounts to the bridging of that distance into the future 
(Pennings & Harianto, 1992), and acquisitive activities can be viewed as 
lateral bridging, linking proprietary know-how and the expertise of target 
firms (cf. Pitts, 1977). Expansions extend a firm's products, markets, tech- 
nologies, and other resources. 
Learning is pertinent in that expansion projects vary in their closeness 
to current organizational cognitions and experiences. Their degrees of prox- 
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statistical advice of Goetz Rohwer, and the comments of Terry Amburgey, Edward Bowman, 
Josef Bruderl, Sea-Jin Chang, Daniel Levinthal, Arjen van Witteloostuijn, and two anonymous 
referees. Errors remain our responsibility. Financial support for the study was furnished by the 
Wurster Center for International Management Studies at the Wharton School of the University 
of Pennsylvania. 
608 
Pennings, Barkema, and Douma 
imity can be inferred from traditional attributes of diversification, including 
direction, mode, location, and ownership. Expansion projects will be more 
certain and familiar if they involve related diversification and existing or- 
ganizations, they take place domestically, and are wholly or majority owned. 
Learning can also be placed in a multiperiod context by stipulating that 
corporate expansions will add to a firm's cognitions and experiences. The 
more a firm has accumulated diversification experiences, the greater is the 
likelihood that a new project is a suitable extension of the firm's boundaries. 
Learning is a useful concept in a theory of diversification because both 
laterally and longitudinally, expansions are beneficial if they are relatively 
proximate to a firm's current skills. 
A large body of literature already exists on the relative benefits of var- 
ious diversification strategies, with the dominant theme being that diversi- 
fiers perform better if their ventures are attached in core competencies (Bet- 
tis & Hall, 1982; Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990; Montgomery, 1985; Palepu, 1985; 
Rumelt, 1974; Varadarajan & Ramanujam, 1987). Much of this literature has 
focused on lateral relatedness. A smaller number of studies have examined 
diversification in a dynamic context. Amburgey and Miner (1992), for ex- 
ample, examined longitudinal relatedness in diversification, whereby a firm 
is more likely to repeat a type of diversification it has already carried out. A 
comprehensive review of the literature by Ramanujam and Varadarajan 
showed that many of the findings to date have been based on cross-sectional 
comparisons of diversified firms. They advocated a departure from current 
practice and stressed the "need to shift the focus of analysis from overall 
profiles of firm diversity to individual diversification projects and cumula- 
tive diversification experiences" (1989: 539). That is, there is a need for 
research that (1) examines individual expansion projects and (2) analyzes 
what managers have learned from those projects. 
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Diversification is a central concept in the field of strategic management. 
Organizations have displayed a wide range of behaviors intended to extend 
the boundaries of their competencies. Many reasons motivate expansions, 
including the transfer of a firm's know-how, enhancement of its scale econ- 
omies, growth in market power, and spreading of risk. 
Conceptualizing a firm's expansions as a matter of organizational learn- 
ing suggests a framework in which corporate cognitions limit the sort of 
actions conceivable. Organizations evolve as they accumulate experiences, 
incrementally adjusting their reactions to similar problems while absorbing 
feedback about past decisions. Inasmuch as expansions represent a homo- 
geneous class of diversification decisions, they are manifest in complex and 
diverse ways. An expansion that follows a firm's trajectory of decisions is 
likely to reflect a plethora of prior decisions that its managers have been 
involved in. Experiences with certain expansions should therefore impart a 
greater capacity to implement subsequent expansions. 
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Expansions are more likely to succeed if they are similar and related to 
what a firm has done before. Repeated behavior by a firm confers compe- 
tency, as such authors as Williamson (1977) and Nelson and Winter (1982) 
have suggested. The Nelson and Winter study is particularly important be- 
cause it stipulates a model of organizational learning. 
Learning has become a prominent concept in organization theory and 
strategic management, but divergent approaches prevail. Nelson and Winter 
(1982) represented an economic view, mixed with psychological concepts 
such as "scripts," which refer to managerial dispositions that affect percep- 
tions and limit the sort of actions available to managers. This approach 
complements the large body of work by March and his colleagues. March's 
(e.g., March, 1988; March, Sproull, & Tamuz, 1991) views on organizational 
learning are complex and anchored in qualitative research. The link between 
outcomes and managers' evaluations of those outcomes is often tenuous. 
Organizations attend to multiple validations of events, decisions, and un- 
derlying aspirations. Significant experiences with corporate expansions 
would depend as much on organizational aspirations as on the actual un- 
folding of events. 
The March position embodies a near phenomenological view and mir- 
rors a strong psychological orientation. Such a position is rich and contrasts 
rather sharply with the "scanty theory of learning" (Van Witteloostuijn 
1990: 184) in economics. The scanty theory seems difficult to link with the 
more analytical, linear, and comparative approach of economists like Nelson 
and Winter (1982) and other recent analysts of organizational learning (cf. 
Carley, 1992; Huber, 1991; Levinthal & Cohen, 1990). Yet the qualitative and 
quantitative approaches have important implications for strategic decision 
making in general and diversification moves in particular. Although we 
followed a comparative research strategy, qualitative inroads are desirable 
and feasible and will be suggested at appropriate locations in this article. 
Nelson and Winter's (1982) contribution exhibits an incremental view 
of diversification. Whether through acquisition or innovation, firms are in- 
clined to stay in the vicinity of their competencies. Discontinuous expan- 
sions are surrounded with more risk and are bound to have higher failure 
rates. Authors writing on the various aspects of diversification appear to 
share this view. For example, there is little evidence of unrelated acquisi- 
tions (Montgomery, 1979) or radical innovations (Pennings & Harianto, 
1992) faring well. Kazanjian and Drazin (1987) elaborated on the issue of 
distance between proprietary and external know-how in their attempt to 
explain diversification failures. 
Diversification Relatedness 
Porter (1987) addressed the question of relatedness and performance on 
the project level. He found that firms divested a very large proportion (60%) 
of corporate acquisitions involving industries unrelated to their own. The 
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implication is that acquired firms and their markets, products, technologies, 
and other specialized resources are difficult to integrate with an acquirer 
whose own skills diverge from those of the acquisition or lack potential 
synergy with them. But relatedness is not without costs. Jones and Hill 
(1988), for example, suggested that the cost of administrating related acqui- 
sitions is significantly higher than the cost of administrating unrelated ones. 
Such costs might trigger divestments (cf. Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1991). 
Relatedness, as Rumelt (1982) showed, is manifested in many different 
ways. Firms can extend their strategic domains horizontally or vertically. 
Authors have distinguished between horizontal, related, and unrelated di- 
versification. These distinctions correspond to varying degrees of an expan- 
sion's cognitive distance from a firm's base, with horizontal being more 
proximate than related, and related more proximate than unrelated. Hori- 
zontal expansions are expected to be more successful than unrelated ones 
simply because they involve projects in the diversifying firm's industry. 
Horizontal expansions at the three- or four-digit Standard Industrial Classi- 
fication (SIC) code level confer greater familiarity than those at the two-digit 
level, since the former reside in the vicinity of a firm's core skills. They also 
engender enhanced economies of scale. Horizontally related expansions are 
also more likely to succeed than unrelated ones because of economics of 
scope. Such economics arise when two products or services share the use of 
a common production factor. 
Vertical relatedness is more problematic. Rumelt (1974) found that ver- 
tically integrated firms were among the worst performers. In later research 
(1982), however, he found that inferior performance might be industry- 
specific and that if industry differences were held constant, the performance 
of vertically integrated firms did not differ from the average performance in 
their industry. Rumelt did not provide a theoretical basis for his finding, but 
the above-mentioned learning theory suggests a plausible extension. 
We expected vertical expansions to be more successful than unrelated 
expansions for a variety of reasons. First, managers tend to be much more 
familiar with supplier and customer industries in a vertical expansion than 
in an unrelated expansion. For this reason alone, fewer mistakes in making 
diversification decisions are expected. Second, the development and intro- 
duction of radically new products may require specific investments in sev- 
eral stages of production and distribution. Synchronization of such invest- 
ment decisions may be easier to achieve within one firm or with partners 
with which a firm is well acquainted. 
Synchronization is essentially a transaction cost argument, but it can be 
supplemented with the present familiarity argument. Whenever transactions 
depend on specific investments, vertical integration will be beneficial 
(Williamson, 1977, 1985). If the rate of innovation increases, the need for 
specific investments also increases. To the extent that managers are able to 
identify situations with increasing asset specificity, vertical expansions will 
be beneficial. Vertical technological interdependence also augments famil- 
iarity, and firms show a high propensity toward close interfirm ties. For 
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example, research on the automobile industry by Clark and Fujimoto (1991) 
revealed that vertically interdependent firms form dense social networks 
and enduring, cooperative supplier arrangements. Such supplier arrange- 
ments are likely to diffuse information vertically and result in spillover of 
intangible assets among the firms involved. 
Hypothesis 1: Horizontal, related, and vertical expan- 
sions are more likely to succeed than unrelated expan- 
sions. 
Location of Expansion: Global Relatedness 
Relatedness can also vary with respect to the location of expansion 
projects, and geographical dispersion has in fact been proposed as an alter- 
native strategy for risk dispersion (Kim, Hwang, & Burgers, 1989). Buhner 
(1987), for example, argued that firms might opt for foreign expansion when 
domestic horizontal and vertical diversification are no longer feasible. 
Kogut and Singh (1988) partly corroborated this view, finding that large 
industrial firms preferred "greenfield operations," or newly created estab- 
lishments. Their study also made another point concerning relatedness and 
learning: Barriers to foreign entry need not be exclusively economic, but can 
also be social. In fact, the greater the cultural distance between two coun- 
tries, the less likely is a firm from one country to expand single-handedly 
into the other. Firms that expand globally will encounter different customs, 
traditions, and beliefs about management. 
The issue is highly complex, however. Interactions between location 
and mode of expansion are possible. Apart from national culture, other 
dimensions render foreign expansion more hazardous than domestic expan- 
sion. Differences in economic development, regulatory traditions, political 
infrastructure, and memberships in economic blocks all may increase the 
riskiness of foreign expansion (Pennings, 1994). Therefore, 
Hypothesis 2: Domestic expansions are more likely to 
succeed than foreign ones. 
Mode of Expansion: Acquisition Versus Innovation 
The form in which expansion projects are implemented is a third at- 
tribute that defines the appropriateness of diversification. Takeovers and 
new ventures are profoundly different diversification alternatives, and those 
differences have triggered a great deal of interest and controversy. Porter 
(1987) and Hitt and his colleagues (Hitt, Hoskisson, & Harrison, 1991; Hitt, 
Hoskisson, Ireland, & Harrison, 1991a, 1991b) have pointed to some of the 
advantages start-ups have over acquisitions. 
Porter (1987) has been a rather vocal critic of expansion through acqui- 
sition, stating that firms build up their competencies through internal de- 
velopment, slowly and incrementally extending their domains. Homegrown 
expansion is embedded in the accumulated skills of a firm, but acquired 
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expansion expends major resources for the sake of subsequent amalgamation 
with the acquired firm's stock of know-how. Unlike acquisitive diversifiers, 
who seek to shortcut the slow and stepwise advancement of that stock, 
internal diversifiers follow a process of "logical incrementalism" (Quinn, 
1980). The implication is that start-ups should be compatible with their 
present firms. Porter's research is rather descriptive and anecdotal, but the 
recent work by Hitt and his colleagues cited above and research from pop- 
ulation ecology (e.g., Bruderl, Preisendorfer, & Ziegler, 1992) hint that the 
factorings accounting for spillover are rather complex. 
It could be suggested that acquisitions and start-ups represent alterna- 
tive instruments of diversification. It would be consistent with the learning 
framework proposed here for firms to prefer acquisitions, which entail fewer 
risks than start-ups. Further, attachment to a long-term, acquisitive stance 
might strengthen a diminished propensity to internal development. Hitt, 
Hoskisson, and Ireland (1990) implied that a wish for such strengthening is 
one of the reasons managers make acquisitions rather than invest in inno- 
vation. They opt for familiar, less risky alternatives. But such conduct pre- 
vents a firm from building up unique proprietary skills that endow it with a 
continued advantage. In related work, Hitt and his colleagues (Hitt et al., 
1991; Hitt et al., 1991a) pointed out that dwindling investments in R&D 
reduce a firm's long-term competitiveness. 
The issue is whether firms are able to gain enough first-mover advan- 
tages through successful new ventures to offset losses on unsuccessful new 
ventures. Existing firms and their business units, as targets of acquisition, 
have moved beyond the "liability of newness" stage (Stinchcombe, 1965). 
Fewer acquisitions will fail than will internally developed new ventures, but 
acquiring firms have to pay a price for such lower risk: acquisitions come 
with a premium. Other research (e.g., Hitt et al., 1991b) suggests that inter- 
nally developed new ventures, when successful, will contribute much more 
than acquisitions to the competitive advantage and value of a firm. In fact, 
most empirical studies published in the finance literature have shown that 
acquiring firms' shareholders lose, or at least do not gain (Jarrell, Brickley, & 
Netter, 1988; Jensen, 1986). 
Research from the population ecology tradition echoes these observa- 
tions. Freeman (1990), for example, found that the mortality rate of internal 
corporate ventures was considerably lower than that of independent ven- 
tures. It would be interesting to know the fates of certain new ventures that 
Freeman classified as dead when they were acquired by other firms; they 
may in fact still be alive. In this study, we did not classify acquired firms or 
business units as failures or deaths. It is also worth mentioning that Bruderl, 
Preisendorfer, and Ziegler (1992) found "follower" businesses to have better 
survival chances than newcomers. They attributed this finding to differences 
in human capital, which may be lower in new firms. Obviously, start-ups 
triggered by an existing firm can exploit economies of scope and scale, 
particularly if the start-up is somewhat related to the core skills of the firm. 
However, regardless of the other expansion attributes, the odds of sur- 
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vival for new ventures should be relatively dismal. Start-ups entail a con- 
siderable degree of risk because of the liability of newness. They start at the 
beginning of the learning curve. Although firms can use their homegrown 
skills as a form of leverage when setting up a new venture, they face large 
hurdles before a venture has solidified its position. On the basis of this 
cursory review of the literature, we hypothesized 
Hypothesis 3: Acquisitions of business units or firms are 
more likely to succeed than new ventures. 
Ownership of Expansion: Alone or with Strategic Partners 
Organizations can undertake expansion alone or share ownership with 
strategic partners. With the decline of merger activity and the rise of joint 
venturing in the 1990s, there is considerable interest in the motivations and 
consequences of divided ownership and control. Shared equity and control 
has diffused widely and appears to be a common arrangement for organiza- 
tions to increase the realms of their businesses. The contributions of multi- 
ple partners are not without difficulties, however. Joint ventures entail hy- 
brid forms of structure, staffing, accounting, and payouts (Powell, 1990), 
challenging organizations that experiment with interfirm relationships. 
Firms accumulate relationship-specific assets, which may lead to increased 
commitments. The persistence of alliances is the result of mutual familiar- 
ization among the partners involved. Yet diversification with partners en- 
genders more unfamiliarity than solitary diversification. Lateral learning is 
indicated by the extent of ownership in that fully owned ventures are more 
proximate to a firm's purview than are partially owned projects. 
Two views on shared ownership prevail; they could be labeled the 
"agency" and "strife" views. That jointly owned expansion projects present 
agency problems was already pointed out by Demsetz and Lehn, who argued 
that "in a very diffusely owned firm, the divergence between costs and 
benefits would be much larger for the typical owner, and he can be expected 
to respond by neglecting some tasks of ownership" (1990: 203). Their inter- 
pretation is applicable to concentrated ownership, ownership of large 
blocks, and joint ventures. For the present study, the implication is that full 
owners of ventures and majority owners, such as large holders of stock in 
publicly traded firms, are more strongly motivated to monitor and control 
their venture's strategic conduct than owners of more diffusely owned ven- 
tures. 
The view of joint ownership as strife can be discerned in the work of 
Kogut (1988). Partners often face discord that was not anticipated at the 
onset of their alliance. Mechanisms for resolving dissension might be absent 
or inadequate. Conflicts and subsequent uncertainty might be most severe in 
the case of equal ownership, in which neither of two partners can readily 
prevail. The added uncertainty of incomplete control and ambiguity render 
partly owned expansions risky. 
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As it appeared evident that ownership structure does not have a mono- 
tonic relationship with diversification outcomes, our empirical tests re- 
quired further refinements. Fully owned ventures involve less risk than 
partially owned ventures. The magnitude of agency problems is proportional 
to the extent of ownership claims. Conflict and power issues are most salient 
when strategic partners maintain equal equity. The following general hy- 
pothesis was tested: 
Hypothesis 4: Fully and majority-owned expansion pro- 
jects are more likely to succeed than equally and non- 
majority-owned expansion projects. 
Interactive Effects 
The variables linked with the four hypotheses should not be seen in 
isolation but rather ought to be examined for interactive relationships with 
expansion activities. Certain combinations of the four diversification attrib- 
utes can minimize the cognitive distance between a current and desirable 
strategic position. Jointly owned related expansions will fare less well than 
those that are fully owned. Start-ups that are horizontal or vertical will fare 
better than those that are unrelated. A positive state of all four attributes 
combined describes the expansion projects with the lowest risk. 
Gains from overcoming market failures (Williamson, 1977) abroad 
should be considerable for firms that initiate greenfield operations, which 
afford new opportunities to exploit firm-specific assets. These gains should 
be less for domestic start-ups, in which a firm is already exploiting its econ- 
omies of scope. It is therefore interesting to examine the interaction effects 
by isolating the duration of foreign start-ups. Interaction effects might be 
more appropriate explanations of success than the main effects of either the 
mode or location variables alone. The main effects may be negative, since 
both foreign and start-up ventures are likely to suffer from high uncertainty 
and unfamiliarity. Foreign start-ups are often sales and distribution offices 
that introduce a diversifying firm's products in offshore markets. 
Offshore acquisitions not only require a firm to familiarize itself with an 
alien national culture-a process that might be described as acculturation- 
but also require the firm to become acquainted with an alien organizational 
culture, that of its target firm. Such double acculturation does not occur with 
foreign start-ups, where the acculturation is limited to the host country's 
culture. Such considerations do not nullify the second and third hypothesis. 
Rather, these observations suggest that in the case of foreign start-ups, the 
nonfamiliarity argument is weaker than it would be on the basis of the main 
effects, of mode and location, alone. 
These considerations illustrate that strategic decisions about the mode 
and location of expansion are interrelated and extend previous research on 
relatedness and mode (Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1991; Simmonds, 1990) and 
on location and mode (Geringer, Beamish, & daCosta, 1989). Of course, nu- 
merous other interactions could be added. For example, the rate of demise of 
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horizontal foreign start-up ventures that are minority-owned could be inves- 
tigated. Two-, three-, and even four-way interaction terms are theoretically 
feasible but not practical methodologically. Furthermore, the above theoret- 
ical reflections suggest that some variables might attenuate rather than am- 
plify outcomes. Perhaps these offsetting effects might explain the inconclu- 
sive results of Simmonds (1990), who contrary to his prediction, discovered 
that the performance of start-ups was superior to that of acquisitions. 
Expansion Experiences 
This review needs to be supplemented by a brief reference to the ex- 
pansion experiences that firms accumulate in the course of time. Earlier, we 
pointed out that firms will succeed in venturing outside the realm of their 
core skills if the distance between the firm and the expansion is compara- 
tively small or incremental. This study also examined longitudinal learning 
as an aspect of diversification, answering the plea of Ramanujam and Vara- 
darajan (1989), by stipulating that firms with successful track records in 
regard to expansions are more likely to be successful in the future. Although 
this prediction has been borne out in research on innovation (e.g., Pennings 
& Harianto, 1992), it has not been tested for diversification in general. 
Learning is manifested in two ways. The stated hypotheses pertain to 
the content of a firm's core skills and the degree to which new expansions 
have an affinity to that content. The more remote a particular expansion, the 
more shallow is the firm's ability to manage it. Learning can also be gained 
temporally, from a firm's cumulative experiences, or the process of doing (cf. 
Pennings & Harianto, 1992; Rosenberg, 1987). In this study, we viewed the 
stream of a firm's diversification decisions as endowing it with cumulative 
skills. Expansions will face a better fate if the firm has been a successful 
diversifier before, or if it has had a strong proclivity to expand. During the 
merger and acquisition wave of the 1970s and 1980s, most firms probably 
participated in the economy-wide increase in merger activity, but the sub- 
sequent waves of divestment suggest that not all firms were successful in 
retaining their acquisitions. In fact, many firms retrenched and possibly 
refocused their strategies, with corresponding improvements in performance 
(Markides, 1992). 
Over time, learning can be inferred from the prior longevity of expan- 
sion projects or simply from the magnitude of expansion activities, suggest- 
ing 
Hypothesis 5: The expansion projects of firms that have 
successfully diversified before are more likely to succeed 




The unit of analysis in this study was individual expansion projects. 
The number of projects studied was 462. Diversification data came from 14 
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large nonfinancial firms in the Netherlands over a period of 23 years, 1966- 
88. We chose this period because 1966 represents a break in Dutch merger 
and acquisition activity (de Jong, 1988). Before that year, merger and acqui- 
sition levels were low and stable; after 1966, there was a sharp increase. We 
originally defined the population of firms for study as the 20 largest (in terms 
of sales) nonfinancial firms in the Netherlands, a group analogous to the 
U.S. Fortune 500. In addition, firms had to be listed on the Amsterdam 
Stock Exchange. We excluded the four largest firms, Royal Dutch, Shell, 
Unilever, Philips Electronic Industries, and Akzo. These firms are incorpo- 
rated in the Netherlands, but an overwhelming proportion of their invest- 
ments and business operations take place outside the Netherlands. These 
firms also differ significantly from the other firms in the population in terms 
of the breadth of their activities, their size, and so on. For example, Royal 
Dutch represents almost 50 percent of the capitalization of the 
Amsterdam Stock Exchange. The study group left after the exclusions was 
fairly homogeneous, so size-related effects were unlikely to shape the out- 
comes of the study. We made no attempt to provide a representative survey 
of Dutch industry and commerce; rather, our objective was to test some 
hypotheses on diversification performance that should be replicated in other 
settings. 
All expansion projects reported in the firms' annual reports were stud- 
ied. For two firms, Nedlloyd and KLM, the information in the annual report 
was incomplete or misleading, and we decided to eliminate them from the 
study group. When some doubt existed about the creation or dissolution of 
diversification projects, we consulted Het Financiele Dagblad, the Dutch 
equivalent of the Wall Street Journal. In some cases, we contacted firm 
representatives by telephone to verify information or to eliminate ambiguity 
about coding. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on 462 projects by firm, 
classifying the projects by the qualitative variables from which we inferred 
lateral learning. Table 1 also provides the firms' sales and market value for 
the last year of the study, 1988. 
We coded all expansion data and firm-level information according to 
prespecified criteria and verified each others' classifications. In cases of 
doubt, we consulted a third researcher, but such cases were relatively infre- 
quent. For vertical projects, some judgment was required in about 20 percent 
of the cases as to whether transactions between the expansion and parent 
firm could actually take place. The status of most of these projects could 
readily be coded after discussion. 
For triangulation purposes, we asked an independent judge to classify a 
randomly selected subset of expansions. The interrater reliability between 
the ratings of this neutral judge and our ratings was satisfactory. Only 4 
percent of the projects originally classified as vertical and 2 percent of the 
related projects were assigned to different categories. Moreover, the most 
frequent difference was that ventures initially classified as vertical were 
secondarily coded as unrelated. This error does not adversely affect the 
hypothesis testing because the error is in the direction opposite the one 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics for Firms and Expansion Projectsa 
Market Expansion 100% Majority Minority 
Firmb Salesc Value' Projects Related Horizontal Vertical Start-up Domestic Ownership Ownership Ownership Censored 
n 
Ahold 14.638 2.770 21 42.9 23.8 14.3 33.3 81.0 5.7 0.0 4.8 71.4 S 
DSM 10.121 4.620 52 44.2 30.8 3.8 21.2 51.9 80.8 9.6 5.8 38.5 g 
Hoogovens 7.868 2.239 61 59.0 18.0 6.6 57.4 14.8 70.5 14.8 8.2 57.4 
Heineken 6.104 4.390 47 29.8 10.6 14.9 46.8 66.0 59.6 10.6 19.1 42.6 
DAF 5.201 1.583 13 61.5 0.0 7.7 7.7 69.2 92.3 7.7 0.0 30.8 
Buhrmann-Tetterode 4.569 2.101 46 54.3 32.6 6.5 65.2 28.3 76.1 6.5 4.3 60.9 g 
Wessanen 3.806 1.479 25 68.0 12.0 12.0 24.0 28.0 60.0 28.0 12.0 20.0 
KBB 3.025 809 41 7.3 31.7 24.4 24.4 46.3 31.7 17.1 34.1 51.2 g 
HBG 3.020 610 38 34.2 10.5 7.9 13.2 57.9 86.8 5.3 5.3 26.3 D 
Hunter Douglas 2.783 1.841 11 36.4 27.3 0.0 54.5 81.8 63.6 0.0 9.1 90.9 
Internatio Muller 2.649 497 19 42.1 47.4 10.5 15.8 94.7 78.9 5.3 15.8 36.8 
KNP 2.510 2.278 19 36.8 57.9 0.0 31.6 68.4 84.2 0.0 10.5 42.1 
VNU 2.504 1.421 39 46.2 2.6 30.8 33.3 61.5 82.1 5.1 2.6 64.1 . 
VOC 2.410 666 30 73.3 0.0 3.3 53.5 30.0 53.3 0.0 26.7 40.0 
a 
Percentage breakdowns by quantitative variables do not add up to 100 percent because only N - 1 categories are listed. 
b Full names are available from authors. 
c In millions of Dutch guilders in 1988. 
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stipulated by the hypotheses, so it therefore adds credibility to the empirical 
tests reported here. 
Variables 
Diversification. Expansion projects were coded as belonging to one of 
the following categories: horizontally related (coded 1), used if an expansion 
took place within the Dutch equivalent of an SIC three-digit category; related 
(2), used if an expansion took place within a two-digit SIC category; unre- 
lated (3), used if none of the other three categories applied; or vertically 
related (4), used if an expansion took place within a firm's value-added 
chain. 
It is important to reiterate that our focus was on expansion projects. 
Thus, the diversification measure characterized relatedness between the 
firms and specific projects, not overall firm diversification, which often 
defies simple categorization based on industrial classification. 
Other issues can be raised on the use of industry-classification-based 
diversification proxies. Simmonds (1990) resorted to an arbitrary cutoff 
point when imposing a diversification metric. He classified firms whose 
largest group of related businesses (two-digit code) accounted for 40 percent 
or more of their total sales as related diversifiers and those with less than 40 
percent as unrelated diversifiers. Rumelt (1974) and Pitts (1977) employed 
other cutoffs. We avoided such arbitrary cutoff points in the present study. 
Assignment of expansion projects to the vertical category was based on 
a judgment as to whether intracompany transfers of goods and services could 
take place, as annual reports do not give data on actual transfers. Naturally, 
such judgments might have added noise to the data, since not all transfers 
that might take place actually do materialize. Again, if the results do not 
confirm the hypothesis that vertical expansions are more successful than 
unrelated ones, the disclaimer on the measure of product diversification 
applies here as well. 
Location. We coded an expansion as domestic (1) if it was implemented 
within the Netherlands and as foreign (2) if it occurred elsewhere, including 
in a European Union country. 
Mode. We coded an expansion as an acquisition (1) if it entailed the 
takeover of an existing firm or a business unit and as a start-up (2) if it did 
not. 
Our classification of ventures by mode represents another departure 
from current practice in strategic diversification research. Pitts (1977), La- 
mont and Anderson (1985), and Simmonds (1990) classified firms as exter- 
nally diversified if mergers and acquisitions accounted for 10 percent or 
more of the change in firm sales; otherwise, they were classified as internally 
diversified. Such arbitrary cutoffs could be avoided in the present study, 
where the mode of expansion was defined unequivocally from primary 
sources. 
Ownership. Full ownership (1) was coded if an expansion was 100 
percent controlled by the diversifier. Majority ownership (2) was coded if 
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the diversifier owned between 50.1 and 100 percent of the equity. Equal 
ownership (3) was coded if the diversifier had a 50 percent stake, and mi- 
nority ownership (4) was coded if the diversifier owned less than 50 percent 
of the expansion's equity. 
Expansion experiences. Longitudinal learning was measured as a three- 
year (or five-year) moving average of previous projects' longevity, that is, a 
moving average that was treated as a proxy of a firm's past diversification 
success. For each new project, this average covered strings of three (or five) 






where i = firm, j = project, and t = time. Ni,t_1 is the number of firm i's 
projects alive at t - 1. Ageij,t 1, is the age of projects up to t - 1, that is, up 
to one time unit prior to a new expansion project. This variable was lagged 
to offset the overlap between this covariate and the hazard of new expan- 
sions. 
The average was calculated by taking the mean duration of all projects 
in a three-year period over all projects initiated in that three-year period. We 
treated any expansion lasting more than three years as having lasted three 
years to accommodate the calculation of three-year moving averages. It 
should be pointed out that if a firm's expansion venture lasted three years, 
the conditional longevity was rather high. The percentage of projects dis- 
solved was a small proportion of all projects that lasted three years or longer. 
A firm's track record in its diversification conduct informed us about its 
changing capacity to absorb and integrate a new entity into its operations. By 
contrast, high levels of divestment of expansion projects or restructuring 
activity conveyed failure to implement expansions successfully. Of course, 
some divestments could be interpreted as successful or beneficial, even if 
negative returns or even liquidation accompanied dissolution. This inter- 
pretation applied particularly to innovations and joint ventures involving 
acquisitions and start-ups through which the transfer of know-how had ma- 
terialized. Obviously, learning does not always translate into standard ac- 
counting indicators of performance, particularly if the focus is on projects 
that have endowed a firm with absorptive capacity (Levinthal & Cohen, 
1990), whose future payoffs cannot readily be discerned with such indica- 
tors. 
Unfortunately, the creation of learning variables as defined by a three- 
year moving average confronted us with the awkward problem of left cen- 
soring. Our window of observations precluded access to diversification pro- 
jects that were initiated, and possibly dissolved, before the first year of the 
period. We decided to use the first three years of the period to construct a 
baseline for each firm, although this procedure resulted in the removal of 80 
observations from the data. To conduct a sensitivity analysis, we also com- 
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puted a five-year average. Sensitivity analysis permits us to determine the 
robustness of results. 
We also examined alternative measures of learning. They included per- 
centage of surviving expansions and a measure of diversification proclivity. 
In the results section we dwell primarily on the earlier moving average 
variable but point to findings with respect to diversification proclivity, that 
is, levels of past expansion activity. Learning can be viewed as a firm's 
cumulative expansions, regardless of their outcomes. March (1988) formu- 
lated the notion of "superstitious learning," stating that a firm learns from its 
projects even if success cannot be assessed in terms of an objective outcome. 
Thus, we measured diversification proclivity as the logarithm of the number 
of expansions initiated up to t - 1, regardless of outcome. The greater a 
firm's diversification proclivity, the better the odds of success for new ex- 
pansion projects. 
In addition, we considered control variables that could be interpreted as 
relevant to a firm's resource base and, by implication, the success of its 
expansions. The first control variable, profitability, was included because 
Jensen (1986) argued that highly profitable firms, especially those in mature 
businesses in which investment opportunities are limited, are likely to have 
extensive cash flows in excess of what is needed to fund investment projects 
with positive net present value. Top managers are inclined to invest such 
free cash in possibly unprofitable expansion projects, rather than in stock 
repurchases or stock dividend payouts. Similarly, we included size because 
large firms command more resources than small ones and therefore have a 
greater capacity to sustain ill-fitted acquisitions. These aspects of firms are 
outside the theoretical purview of this study, however. To control for con- 
ditions pertaining to firm (and, by implication, industry) differences, as well 
as seasonality, we added two sets of dummies. First, we included 13 (N - 1) 
dummy variables for all firms; second, we added three 5-year periods, 1966- 
70, 1971-75, and 1976-80, with the remaining years representing the omit- 
ted category. Finally, we added the year an expansion project was initiated 
to various models to test the hypotheses. The period dummies can be con- 
strued as reflecting macro-economic fluctuations. 
Model 
The study employed a proportional hazard rate analysis, the Cox model 
(Allison, 1984; Rohwer, 1992), which is based on the assumption that di- 
vestment can be modeled as a logarithmic linear function of its covariates. 
The effects of the covariates are multiplicative because logarithmic param- 
eters are added in a regression analysis. We chose the Cox model because of 
its flexibility. Unlike discrete time models, such as the log-normal and 
Weibull models (Allison, 1984), the Cox model does not require identifica- 
tion of a specific, distinct hazard function. The objective of this study was 
not to fit a particular rate function, but to obtain the covariates' coefficients. 
The effects obtained under the Cox model indicate the relative effect of 
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each covariate on the survivor function. The estimates are logarithmic like- 
lihoods. In the regression analysis, we included both discrete variables that 
did not vary over time, such as types of diversification and mode of expan- 
sion, and continuous, time-varying constructs, such as learning, profitabil- 
ity, and sales. Proportional hazard models are quasiparametric because they 
rank the different durations so that the rank order of all projects represents 
the dependent variable. The model maximizes the proportional likelihood 
function that expansion project ij will be dissolved at time t, conditional on 
the hazards of other expansion projects at this time. Formally stated, 
ho(t) exp [ritXi(t) + Xi Zi(t - 1) + bijBij] 
Log t ho(t)[2Rt exp (pit Xi(t) + Xi Zi(t - 1) + bBi)] ' (2) 
where ho(t) is the baseline hazard rate at time t, Rt is the risk set of expansion 
projects at time t, and Z and Xi(t) are time-varying covariates; B does not vary 
over time. Unlike parametric models, such as the Weibull and log-normal, 
Cox models do not specify a baseline, so that any misspecification does not 
include bias. It is always assumed that the baseline is the same for all ex- 
pansion projects, so the term ho(t) cancels out. The terms of the above equa- 
tion are as follows: 
Xi(t) = time-varying covariates of attributes of firm i at time t, 
Xli(t) = return on investment of firm i at time t, 
X2i(t) = assets (log) of firm i at time t, 
Zi(t) = time-varying covariate of diversification of firm i prior to 
expansion, 
Zli(t - 1) = cumulative duration average of expansion projects in firm i 
at time t - 1, 
Z2ti(t - 1) = log of cumulative diversification trials of firm i at time t -1 
(alternate learning variable), 
Zj(t) = year t of project j's founding (control variable), 
Bij = vector of categorical variables of jth expansion project of 
firm i, 
Blii = project j of firm i's line of business, 
B2ii = project j of firm i's mode, 
B3ij = project j of firm i's location, 
and 
B4ij = project j of firm i's ownership structure. 
As claimed before, the duration of a venture can be construed as a 
measure of process. Long-enduring projects were deemed viable unless there 
were indications in an annual report that a venture had languished. If an 
expansion was dissolved after problems were reported, it was classified as a 
failure. 
The two learning variables, the three-year moving average of expansion 
projects and the logarithm of the number of trials up to the year of expansion, 
were examined separately. We used alternative tests to further sharpen our 
test of organizational divestments as a function of prior experiences. 
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RESULTS 
All diversification activities could be classified on the basis of informa- 
tion that was derived from the annual reports. Tables 2 and 3 are contin- 
gency tables; they describe the categories of expansion projects in greater 
detail and provide information on the dependency of some of the attributes 
in estimating the survival of diversification. Table 4 presents the means, 
standard deviations, and product-moment correlations between the inde- 
pendent variables. 
Among the total set of expansion projects, 242 were still in existence in 
1988 and thus were right-censored. The remaining 220 were discontinued 
before that year (see Table 1). The median duration of expansion projects 
varied by arbitrarily defined groups. The median duration, calculated using 
product limit estimation functions, or life tables (SAS Institute, 1988), sug- 
gested that with location controlled, ventures lasted longer if they repre- 
sented related diversification, were the result of acquisitions, or were not 
minority owned. For example, the median duration of new ventures is 12.6 
years, and of acquisitions, 17.6 years. The three categories of related projects 
enjoyed an average longevity of 14.4 years, the unrelated ones, 10.3 years. 
These differences are significant at the 5 percent level. The findings are 
congruent with graphs showing survival curves. Unrelated, nonmajority 
owned, and newly founded ventures show steeper decay curves-or their 
complements display more positively sloping survival rates. Figures 1, 2, 3, 
and 4 show the survival curves for the four types of expansions. The hori- 
zontal axes represent years, the vertical axes, the proportions surviving. It 
should be noted that these plots do not show survival curves plotted with 
other variables held constant. 
Figure 1 reveals clear differences among the four categories of related- 
TABLE 2 
Cross-Tabulations of Diversification Type by Mode, Location, and 
Ownership Structure of Expansion Projects 
Horizontal Related Unrelated Vertical Total 
Variables N % N % N % N % N % 
Mode 
New venture 87 18.83 34 7.36 35 7.58 15 3.25 171 37.01 
Acquisition 120 25.97 62 13.42 73 15.80 36 7.79 291 62.99 
Location 
Domestic 69 14.94 52 11.26 72 15.58 34 7.36 227 49.13 
Foreign 138 29.87 44 9.52 36 7.79 17 3.68 235 50.87 
Ownership 
Full 151 32.68 78 16.88 62 13.42 34 7.36 325 70.35 
50.1-100% 18 3.90 8 1.73 11 2.38 5 1.08 42 9.09 
50% 19 4.11 4 0.87 16 3.46 2 0.43 41 8.87 
<50% 19 4.11 6 1.30 19 4.11 10 2.16 54 11.69 
Total 207 44.81 96 20.78 108 23.38 51 11.04 462 100.00 
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TABLE 3 
Cross-Tabulations of Mode by Ownership Structure and Location of Expansion Projects 
Ownership Location 
Full 50.1-100% 50% <50% Domestic Foreign Total a 
Mode N % N % N % N % N % N % N % ? 
New venture 106 22.94 11 2.38 27 5.84 27 5.84 58 12.55 113 24.46 171 37.01 
Acquisition 219 47.40 31 6.71 14 3.03 27 5.84 169 36.58 122 26.41 291 62.99 
Total 325 70.35 42 9.09 41 8.87 54 11.69 227 49.13 235 50.87 462 100.00 ? 
CD 
TABLE 4 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Product-Moment Correlations Between Independent Variables 
Variables Means s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Horizontal relatedness 0.45 0.50 
2. Relatedness 0.21 0.41 -.46 
3. Unrelatedness 0.23 0.42 -.50 -.28 
4. Vertical relatedness 0.11 0.31 -.32 -.18 -.19 
5. Start-up expansion 0.37 0.48 .09 -.02 -.05 -.05 
6. Foreign expansion 0.51 0.50 .28 -.05 -.19 -.12 .23 
7. 100% ownership 0.70 0.46 .05 .12 -.16 -.03 -.14 -.11 
8. Majority ownership 0.09 0.29 -.01 -.01 .02 .01 -.07 .11 -.49 
9. 50% ownership 0.09 0.28 .01 -.08 .11 -.06 .19 .03 -.48 -.10 
.0. Minority ownership 0.12 0.32 -.07 -.09 .10 .09 .10 .02 -.56 -.11 -.11 
.1. Size 12.52 1.19 -.19 -.06 .20 .10 -.16 -.08 -.21 .07 .04 .19 
.2. Return on capital 0.14 0.07 .11 -.01 -.07 -.06 .12 .12 .10 .05 -.04 -.16 -.48 
.3. Year of expansion 74.17 4.38 .01 .00 .04 -.07 .03 .13 .07 -.03 -.00 -.07 .20 -.20 
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ness. Vertical expansions are by far the most persistent. The longevity of this 
subgroup is considerably better than that of any of the other subgroups. The 
unrelated expansions, as expected, were the shortest-lived and liquidated or 
restructured out of firms comparatively early. The other two classes, related 
(same two-digit code) and horizontally related (same three-digit code), oc- 
cupy a middle position, less persistent than the vertical ones, but enjoying 
better survival rates than unrelated expansions. Although we expected a 
difference between the horizontal and related ventures, this graph shows 
them to be quite similar. 
The second graph (Figure 2) contrasts the longevity of acquisitions and 
start-ups. The former clearly outperform the latter, although the difference is 
marginally significant (Mantel-Cox Statistic = 3.583, p = .058). The graph 
also shows that the superiority of acquisitions increased toward the end of 
our observation window. 
Figure 3 provides the curves for domestic and foreign expansions. The 
plots for the two types show a very similar trend, and differences between 
them are not statistically significant. 
Finally, Figure 4 shows the duration curves for expansions having dif- 
ferent ownership structures. Projects in which a firm has exactly a 50 percent 
stake are the most problematic, particularly during their first 10 to 15 years. 
Their data compare rather unfavorably with those for the other forms of 
ownership, including, of course, full ownership. Their persistence is even 
lower than minority-owned expansions, although this latter category catches 
up and eventually shows a greater likelihood of liquidation. Figure 4 dis- 
closes rather clearly the superior durability of full or majority ownership; 
such ventures are more likely to be retained by the diversifier. The overall 
difference between the four curves is significant at the 5 percent level. If the 
50 percent category is contrasted with the remaining ones, the difference is 
highly significant. In short, this last graph uncovers the significance of the 
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It should also be pointed out that Figure 4 shows "mortality crossover" 
(Vaupel & Yashin, 1985). The survival curves of the 50 percent cohort in- 
tersect the rate for the minority cohort. The crossover signals a delayed 
expiration phenomenon for the former category, a feature that is somewhat 
analogous to the earlier mentioned liability of newness. Half-owned ven- 
tures have a higher liability than others. Conversely, minority projects enjoy 
a long adolescence but show higher rates of risk at later stages of their 
existence. Because the two ownership types intersect, their rates are not 
quite proportional. Later in this section, we report results on three owner- 
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Table 5 shows the results of the proportional normal regression analyses 
in terms of the effects of the diversification attributes and the first learning 
variable, average project duration. 
Vertically related projects have the best outlook. Unrelated expansions, 
the omitted category, are contrasted with the three related classes. The co- 
efficients for all three dummies, horizontal, related, and vertical, are nega- 
tive, signaling better survival rates then the unrelated category. The vertical 
relatedness category has a coefficient more than two and a half times its 
standard error. Hypothesis 1 is therefore strongly confirmed. 
Since the dependent variable is the hazard rate, negative relatedness 
coefficients show that the variables have an adverse impact on the hazard 
rate; these results therefore imply longer duration of the expansions with 
high relatedness. 
The results on ownership structure lend support for Hypothesis 4, 
which has two parts. The strife hypothesis is supported in that 50 percent 
ownership is associated with shorter life expectancies. Although the coeffi- 
cient is only marginally significant (and this test is not independent of 
the agency-based test), some support for the strife hypothesis is indicated. 
Fully owned ventures have disproportionately longer durations than the 
other ownership categories, conforming to our agency hypothesis predic- 
tions. 
The analysis was complemented with an examination of the effects of 
the interaction of the mode and location variables. Although all the variables 
might magnify each others' effects, the results presented here are for that 
interaction only; domestic by start-up was coded 1 and other combinations 
were coded 0. When the test for interaction is included, the main effects of 
mode and location become significant and positive. In contrast, the interac- 
tion involving these two covariates is negative and also significant, indicat- 
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TABLE 5 
Results of Regression Analysesa 
Independt Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4b Independent 
Variables b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. 
Horizontal relatedness - .451** .194 - .427** .195 - .461** .194 - .424* .205 
Relatedness - .479* .226 - .432t .228 - .481* .227 - .430t .243 
Vertical relatedness -1.111** .363 -1.101** .363 - 1.705** .363 -1.394** .374 
Mode .195 .168 .150 .171 .692* .241 .050 .173 
Location .086t .238 .075 .169 .415* .203 .191 .180 
Full ownership -.558* 2.279 
Majority ownership -.485 .336 
Minority ownership -.106 .349 
50% ownership .465* .238 .371 .243 .349 .244 
Mode x location -.848* .317 
Moving duration average -.431* .181 -.434* .181 -.430* .176 -.427* .193 
Return on capital -1.680 1.596 -1.486 1.705 -1.841 1.186 -.532 1.707 
Size -1.168* .079 - .189* .080 -.205** .080 - .269 .302 
Year .102** .029 .104** .029 .099** .029 .050 .058 
Log likelihood -982.32 -980.76 -978.82 -963.82 
X2 39.27 42.56 47.57 78.42 
"N = 382. 
b Coefficients of firm dummies and period dummies are not shown. If 50 percent ownership becomes the omitted category, only full ownership 
is significant: b = -.479; s.e. = .252; p < .10. 
t p < .10 
p < .05 
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ing that foreign start-ups are more persistent than the other three classes of 
expansion projects. 
We also tested a model that contained all five other possible interactions 
between the independent variables. However, all coefficients associated 
with these five interactions were insignificant. The increment in the chi- 
square statistic was also insignificant. In models 3 and 4, the addition of all 
the interaction terms does not lead to a significant increment in chi-square. 
In summary, the results shown in Table 5 confirm the prediction re- 
garding product diversification (Hypothesis 1) and when refashioned, the 
ownership prediction, Hypothesis 4. Hypotheses 2 and 3 are also supported, 
although that support requires the inclusion of the mode-location interaction. 
Table 5 also shows the results on longitudinal learning, as measured by 
the time-variant expansion experiences (the moving duration average). The 
effect of learning is rather strong, in the hypothesized direction, and signif- 
icant at the 5 percent level across the different models. Prior positive expe- 
riences with expansion projects appears to raise the odds that new ventures 
will last. 
Size also has strong effects. The inclusion of size, profitability, year, and 
their interactions in the model diminishes the effect of learning. Exclusion of 
size, for example, renders learning significant at the .01 level. The results 
remained robust when we added firm and period dummy variables to the 
model. Clearly, the results are congruent with Hypothesis 5, which predicts 
that experience is conducive to good expansion outcomes. 
When we replaced the learning variable that essentially measures the 
idea that success breeds success with the alternate learning variable, the 
total number of expansions from 1966 onwards, results show significant (p 
< .10) effects for the models analogous to models 1 and 2, but that support 
disappears after interaction effects and firm and period dummies are explic- 
itly modeled. For example, although all the other coefficients are compara- 
ble to those of Table 5, the effect of the second learning variable drops from 
-.183 (p < .10) to -.180 (n.s.) as the standard error increases from .115 to 
.168, based on 438 observations.1 
All these results were obtained with the nonparametric, or at the most, 
quasi-parametric Cox model. We complemented the analysis with paramet- 
ric tests requiring episode splitting2 (Rohwer, 1992), including the Weibull 
and log-normal models, and obtained largely the same results. Because the 
Cox model is more flexible in allowing time-variant covariates, we furnished 
the results obtained under it. 
1 Full results are available on request. 
2 Episode splitting entails the decomposition of time windows into discrete time periods, 
such that all observations are censored during each period, only to be re-entered in the next one. 
This procedure is necessary when the hazard function is assumed to have a specific distribu- 
tion, such as accelerated failure time, and covariates are time variant. 
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DISCUSSION 
In this study, we sought to make a contribution to strategic diversifica- 
tion research through additions in theory development, level of analysis, 
measurement of relatedness, research design, and analytic method. The 
study remained, however, within the tradition of diversification research 
and sharpened our insights about failures of diversification. 
A theory of organizational learning has been proposed in which a firm's 
extension of its competence is viewed as either lateral or temporal and the 
feedback from new ventures is seen as a basis for further development. The 
durability of a diversification project is inferred from a firm's successful 
retention of the project. To test the theory, we adopted a longitudinal re- 
search design that combined variables at the project and firm levels of anal- 
ysis. 
The main findings on lateral learning include the result that vertical, 
horizontal, and related expansion moves have the greatest chance of remain- 
ing integral parts of a firm's portfolio of business activities. Expanding firm 
boundaries at home rather than abroad revealed more complex relationships 
with a venture's survival, although its interaction with mode of expansion 
showed this attribute to be an important aspect. Including this interaction 
effect in the model also led to significant main effects associated with mode 
and location. The results for mode should be interpreted with care, since 
measurement error could be pertinent here: although acquisitions have un- 
ambiguous beginnings, start-ups can be invisible for some time before they 
surface in company archives and annual reports. The implications of all 
these comments are that expansions in general and foreign expansions in 
particular are a very complex phenomenon. Furthermore, given our success- 
ful efforts in moving beyond main effects, future studies should also model 
possible interactions among explanatory variables. 
The significant interaction also suggests that intriguing aspects of diver- 
sification would not have been uncovered if the analysis had been limited to 
main effects alone. Not only do the main effects become significant when the 
interaction term is included in the model; the interaction term also points to 
the importance of a diversifying firm's absorbing both national and corporate 
cultures when it diversifies through foreign acquisitions. Foreign start-ups, 
such as the creation of sales and distribution offices and greenfield manu- 
facturing operations require less learning than acquisitions. Foreign acqui- 
sitions might tax the integrative capacity of a diversifying firm beyond its 
limits. Barkema, Bell, and Pennings (1994) showed that foreign expansions 
required both the bridging of differences between native and host country 
cultures and some affiliation to the strategic partner, which became the 
diversifier's beachhead in host countries. That study employed our second 
index of expansion experiences, log of prior ventures, except that the learn- 
ing variable was specified with respect to the class of expansions whose 
longevity was to be explained. The effect of longitudinal learning was strong 
for both foreign acquisitions and foreign joint ventures having certain own- 
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ership arrangements. Learning effects are largely absent for foreign start-ups. 
Barkema and colleagues invoked the term "double-layered acculturation" to 
account for the stronger effect on diversification beyond national borders 
whenever diversification involves existing firms: the firm has to contend 
with both a foreign national culture and an unfamiliar organizational cul- 
ture. Burgers, Hill, and Kim (1993) shed additional light on the complex 
underpinnings of foreign expansion moves in general and foreign strategic 
alliances in particular. 
The results on longitudinal learning were also consistent with the hy- 
pothesis but were not as robust as the results on lateral learning effects. We 
employed two measures of lateral learning, but only the first-the moving 
duration average of ventures-supported the hypothesis strongly and sig- 
nificantly. Its effect remained when time-related controls were included. 
The test involving the alternate learning variable, the logarithm of the num- 
ber of expansion projects, was not as strong, but this variable overlaps con- 
siderably with time. Year and size indirectly capture cumulative experi- 
ences with expansion projects over time. So it should not be surprising that 
results involving learning proxies are not as strong when time is explicitly 
modeled. A fixed-effects model like model 4 in Table 5 offers an exceedingly 
conservative test of the learning hypotheses because it models only within- 
firm variance over time (Judge, Hull, Griffith, Lutkepohl, & Lee, 1982). Add- 
ing period dummies further reduces the detection of potential effects of 
learning. 
As the term intimates, longitudinal learning has a strong connection 
with time. Accumulation of experiences takes time. Time is a proxy for 
maturation, development, and growth. Including period dummies, as we did 
in model 4, can be construed as creating an indirect proxy for learning, one 
that obviously competes with this study's direct measures of longitudinal 
learning. Treating time as a surrogate for learning is quite common in pro- 
duction function studies. For example, in their study of commercial banks, 
Hunter and Timme (1986) took "years" as proxies for technological change, 
which substituted for other production factors in explaining productivity 
gains in commercial banks. Those authors' measure of years as technological 
change is actually a proxy for maturation or learning. 
In fact, firm size alone, included in all the models, should diminish the 
effect of organizational learning. Firm size is time-variant and therefore rep- 
resents a considerable chunk of organizational learning. After all, whenever 
a firm grows, it will have undertaken more expansions, accumulated more 
experiences, and thus have gone through more learning. At any rate, whether 
time is measured directly or indirectly, the associated occurrence of learning 
should be assumed. It is obvious, however, that much more research is 
needed before definitive conclusions on longitudinal learning about diver- 
sification can be drawn. A related article (Barkema et al., 1994) specifically 
examines firms' cumulative steps onto a path of learning about foreign entry 
modes. 
To summarize, the findings of this study drive home an important point. 
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Firms that diversify take some chances, but they can decrease the probability 
of future divestments if they do not venture too far from their own strategic 
domains and maintain full or majority control over their expansion ventures. 
The diversifying firms in this study also revealed that success breeds success 
if success is defined as the persistence of expansion projects: firms with 
track records of durable ventures are more likely to replicate their good 
expansion performance in the future. Divestment and restructuring do not 
always signal the undoing of ill-chosen ventures, but use of these euphe- 
mistic terms cannot hide the fact that the undoing of past moves is often 
painful and expensive and probably an acknowledgment that investments 
were ill-chosen. Two related issues emerge here: the meaning of learning, 
and divestment as a proxy for failure. 
Divestment and Learning 
Our analysis raises some important aspects of two issues that are not 
traditionally considered in the study of diversification and learning. Our 
main interest has been product differentiation and mode of diversification. 
Given that many diversification moves entail shared ownership, it becomes 
important to consider a firm's experience regarding strategic partnerships 
and joint ventures. Such partnerships are subject to major challenges of 
governance, equity sharing, and control. Since the flurry of merger and ac- 
quisition has subsided and in its aftermath, joint ventures have grown in 
popularity (Kogut, 1988), data on strategic partnerships might currently be 
scant, as data on acquisition conduct were in the mid-1960s (de Jong, 1988). 
Yet there is some evidence that firms with track records of interfirm net- 
working are more likely to replicate that behavior than firms pursuing more 
solitary avenues of innovation. A similar argument applies to firms extend- 
ing their boundaries across national borders. It remains an interesting but 
unconfirmed hypothesis that multinational enterprises with extensive 
across-border expansion projects can better coordinate and integrate busi- 
ness units in multiple countries. Researchers investigating global diversifi- 
cation ought to consider the success of domestic, product, and global diver- 
sification jointly. 
The results of this study merit further research on the learning of stra- 
tegic partnering, a rather new form of implementing diversification strate- 
gies. Ownership takes many forms, and various kinds of hybrid structures 
have emerged. We found that ownership structure is not monotonic with 
respect to the durability of ventures. Various ownership categories can be 
distinguished: full, majority, minority, and half. The latter category appears 
quite unique. Although the hazard rate of the 50-50 subgroup was worse than 
that of those involving other percentages, the variation among the latter 
should be examined more closely. To disentangle agency and strife issues, 
closer examination of joint ventures is necessary. Perhaps strife is more 
prevalent during early phases and agency problems surface during later 
stages. Recall that Figure 4 showed 50 percent ventures to have the steepest 
survival curves. In such projects, the sharing of power by strategic partners 
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might be convoluted and uneasy during the early years of the partnership, 
but as the partners learn, they may become more adept at resolving gover- 
nance conflicts. The partners might settle their post-honeymoon difficulties 
and coexist profitably. Levinthal and Fichman in fact suggested this inter- 
pretation when they wrote that the "persistence of interfirm relationships 
can be viewed as the result of a sorting process in which firms are learning 
about each other" (1988: 353; emphasis added). In contrast, the major own- 
ers of majority-controlled projects have control, and power-sharing and con- 
trol-of-operations issues are relatively dormant. Of course, agency problems 
are absent in fully owned ventures, and these show the best survival pros- 
pects. 
Unlike the other hypotheses, our ownership structure predictions re- 
quire complementary qualitative research. Confidential data involving one 
firm and some of its strategic partners within a value-added chain can reveal 
a process of sorting out issues of mutual concern before interfirm relation- 
ships become durable. Sometimes a firm severs strategic alliance prema- 
turely, truncating decisions that might have yielded more feedback; this 
condition is not uncommon when organizations venture into uncharted de- 
cision settings (March, 1988). Alliances are dissolved for a variety of reasons, 
including lack of trust, superstition, ambiguity, opportunism, inequity of 
know-how transfer, information asymmetry, and conflict about priorities. 
Documentation of such thick observations is largely the realm of learning 
scholars like March and falls outside the purview of this study. 
Divestment: Success and Failure? 
The longevity of expansion projects and the learning process that ac- 
companies them was interpreted as signaling success; ventures liquidated 
relatively early were viewed as less successful than enduring ones. We rec- 
ognize that this opinion of expansion success might provoke a good deal of 
controversy, even though research has shown that divestment of ill-fitting 
expansions, representing unrelated diversification, results in superior organ- 
izational performance (Markides, 1992) and therefore supports the conten- 
tion that unsuitable expansion is not congruent with a firm's interest. Yet 
some might argue that expansions can be highly successful even when they 
are liquidated within a short period of time. For example, projects far re- 
moved from a firm's core skills might be undertaken to transfer expertise. 
When unrelated technologies converge, firms may be tempted to venture 
into distant industries-for example, telecommunication firms might enter 
microelectronics, and chemical firms, biotechnology. Likewise, globaliza- 
tion trends can trigger firms' decisions to expand offshore. Even if dissolved, 
such ventures endow an organization with new experiences. 
Divestitures can indeed represent important sources of diversification 
feedback and may in fact end up creating value for a firm. In fact, although 
ill-fated expansions can be labeled errors, it is prudent not to commingle 
such errors with errors of omission. Firms can make two kinds of errors: 
investments that should have been made but were not, and investments that 
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were made but appeared to be a poor fit. The last type of error will undoubt- 
edly contribute to a firm's know-how, while the first type will not. Divesti- 
tures furnish information about novel areas and endow a firm with increased 
capacity to absorb external technology. Also, consistent with the earlier- 
mentioned work by March (e.g., March et al., 1991), learning is not confined 
to identifiable points of feedback such as net present value or actual disso- 
lution, but in fact is far more continuous, haphazard, and idiosyncratic. 
March and colleagues would claim that even a planned but aborted acqui- 
sition can entail learning. Clearly, there is a need to complement the present 
study with more qualitative research seeking to uncover some of the more 
complex underpinnings of organizational learning. The present results re- 
vealed extensive differences in dissolution rates (see Table 1) among the 14 
firms, but the reasons for those differences remain elusive. In-depth case 
studies of such firms and the tracking of some decision-making processes 
would be highly desirable. Hickson, Butler, Cray, Mallory, and Wilson 
(1986), who conducted field research on some 150 strategic decisions, in- 
cluding expansions and divestments, illustrate such an idiographic ap- 
proach. Although such research was beyond the limits of the present work, 
it should be pursued to obtain a more complete and valid theory of strategic 
learning. 
Success is a complex issue and can certainly be gauged with other 
criteria. Some might argue that hard indicators of performance, such as an 
investment's net present value, internal rate of return, and other financial 
criteria, should be available before one judges an expansion's success. Al- 
though that viewpoint is not without merit, it is important not to dismiss our 
measure of success in favor of other measures. An ideal research design 
would incorporate multiple indicators of performance, but given the state of 
the art, the present measure generates a great deal of insight about expan- 
sions. The current preoccupation with restructuring, retrenchment, down- 
sizing, and other euphemisms for the undoing of strategic diversification 
errors suggests that the longevity of expansion projects is quite appropriate 
as an indicator of success. 
The survival of acquisitions and start-ups probably requires further re- 
finement as a proxy for success. Earlier, we pointed out that acquisitions 
entail a premium because they are comparatively nonrisky, although foreign 
acquisitions require more assimilation than foreign start-ups. The survival of 
such as expansion may, however, furnish lower returns then a successful 
start-up because of first-mover advantages, enhanced absorptive capacity, 
and the opportunity to establish competitive advantage through learning. 
Clearly, an undifferentiated position that all divestitures are failures can be 
erroneous, and it is highly misplaced as a recommendation upon which to 
develop strategy prescriptions for managers. 
In this article, we explicitly recognized that success is a complex issue. 
We distinguished between assessing the performance of individual ventures 
in the terms of longevity and assessing the positive externality of those 
1994 635 
Academy of Management Journal 
ventures in terms of longitudinal learning. A strong correlation between 
these two aspects was expected and uncovered in the empirical testing. 
This last observation is also in accord with the work of several authors 
who have disclosed the complexity of corporate expansions and their dis- 
solution (cf. Burgelman, 1991; Levinthal & Cohen, 1990). These authors do 
not provide quantifiable indicators of success that might be associated with 
corporate ventures. Yet their conceptual discussions point to intangible 
manifestations of mastery that reach far beyond convenient indicators like 
COMPUSTAT-derived indexes. 
Burgelman (1991) addressed the question of the creation of new skills. 
New competencies emerge whenever fledgling start-ups arise without the 
interference of strategic decision makers or encroachment by competing fac- 
tions in an organization. He argued that variation and selection of start-ups 
is conducive to the successful generation of new knowledge. Studying the 
Intel corporation, he attributed the divestment or retention of expansion 
projects to the selective process that resided inside the firm. Having a variety 
of start-ups endows a firm with diversity and improves its flexibility in 
dealing with the evolving situations, such as changing technologies and 
newly emerging dominant designs. Levinthal and Cohen (1990) also invoked 
nonfinancial criteria when they developed the concept of absorptive capac- 
ity. Such capacity is difficult to operationally measure yet significant in 
signaling success such as adaptiveness to rapidly and unpredictably chang- 
ing technological conditions. Parenthetically, both Burgelman and the 
present study present an interesting confrontation with population ecology. 
Our study has an ecological flavor in that it examines the duration of ex- 
pansion projects, yet it presents findings that stress organizational learning 
rather than inertia. What is being selected, both here and in Burgelman's 
study, are projects rather than firms. Both studies develop an argument that 
is based on learning and flexibility rather than on inertia and rigidity. 
Cross-National Issues 
This study's reliance on non-U.S. data is a strength, but its unique 
provenance should be recognized. The sort of data employed in this study 
might not be appropriate for reporting diversification moves in other coun- 
tries. Furthermore, the Netherlands has been a prolific player in foreign 
direct investments, ranking, for example, in the top two or three countries 
among all countries investing in the United States, even though it has a 
comparatively small economy. Foreign start-ups and acquisitions involving 
Dutch firms may therefore have lower failure rates than those involving 
other countries. Obviously, there is a need to develop multiple-country data. 
Similar comments can be made about the role of national governments 
in shaping corporate strategies. In the United States, for example, many 
acquisitive moves would not be admissible as they violate various statutes. 
In the Netherlands, such regulatory constraints have been absent, although 
recently the European Commission has become proactive in regulating firm 
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behavior, particularly if the firms involved are large and have the potential 
to create market power. 
Finally, it is important to note that "foreign" remained largely unspec- 
ified in this study, where proximity to the Netherlands and membership in 
the European Union signaled higher familiarity. For European Union firms, 
expansion into other European Union countries will probably be more suc- 
cessful than expansion into, for example, Pacific Rim countries, where the 
differences in culture and economic regulations will create more difficulties 
(Pennings, 1993). Additional research specifying attributes of foreign sites is 
therefore desirable. Location is a multifaceted diversification attribute and 
requires careful measurement. 
Conclusion 
This study opens up some interesting new lines of research by shifting 
the focus from the firm level to the level of expansion moves. The concept of 
organizational learning can fruitfully be incorporated in a study of expan- 
sion projects examined at a project level. Such a theoretical and empirical 
approach will also help in overcoming the perennial problems of classifying 
firms and their diversification by SIC code or some other arbitrary criterion. 
Future research should consider the dynamic interplay of success factors 
over time. It is important to replicate this study on other national data ar- 
chives and to incorporate research on domestic, product, and global diver- 
sification. The frontiers of knowledge are expanding, thanks to multidisci- 
plinary inputs and advances in research methods and statistical tools. It is 
up to strategy researchers to push those frontiers even further. Finally, this 
study suggests that research driven by a learning theory can produce inter- 
esting and practical insights about corporate diversification and the causes 
of its success or failure. 
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